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le comportement face au risque d’une coopérative financière comparativement à une 
banque d’actionnariat publique. La méthodologie se base sur une définition d’une 
fonction d’utilité pour la coopérative financière fondée sur des critères spécifiques à 
ce type d’institutions. Nous comparons cette dernière à la fonction d’utilité, ou de 
maximalisation du profit, d’une banque d’actionnariat publique. Nous discernons une 
augmentation du niveau optimal de risque pour les deux institutions suite à 
l’introduction de l’assurance dépôt mais cette différence est plus faible pour la 
coopérative financière que pour la banque d’actionnariat publique. La gouvernance 
corporative de l’institution est ainsi un élément important à prendre en considération 
dans l’élaboration d’un régime d’assurance dépôt. Nous trouvons de plus que, de la 
même façon que les banques d’actionnariat publiques, ce risque moral peut être 
atténué à l’aide d’incitatifs tels que des primes ajustées au risque, un capital 
réglementaire ajusté au risque et possiblement des critères de réserve de liquidité. 
 
 
Abstract : In this paper, we analyze the differences of effects of a deposit insurance 
schemes on financial cooperative and joint stock banks risk taking. We develop a 
methodology which includes the specifics of the utility function for the financial 
cooperative and we compare the results to a similar profit maximizing joint stock 
bank. We find that the introduction of deposit insurance does in fact increase optimal 
risk level for the financial cooperative but less so than the stock bank. Thus, 
corporate governance does matter in the level of risk exposure of a deposit insurance 
scheme. Further, like in joint stock banks, this moral hazard can be curbed through 




The purpose of this paper1 is twofold: i) to present a model that allows the evaluation of the e¤ects in terms of
moral hazard (MH) of introducing a deposit insurance (DI) scheme for a …nancial cooperative (FC)2; and ii) to reveal
whether di¤erences in corporate governance (mutal versus stock ownership) matters in the level of risk expousre of
deposit insurance schemes. In the paper we also investigate some mechanisms that may be used by regulators to curb
the incentives to moral hazard that appear with the introduction of such a scheme. The need for this research arises
from the fact that FC are …nancial intermediaries with an objective function that di¤ers notably from that of a joint
stock bank (JSB). However, when considering DI for FC, as in other areas such as regulation and supervision, o¢cials
tend to apply mechanically principles developed for a JSB independent of the di¤erences in coprorate governance.
Although some research has been done on DI and FC (notably Karels and McClatchey [14] and Kane and
Hendershott, [13]) to our knowledge no theoretical model exists that articulates the set of incentives to which FC are
subject when a DI scheme is introduced3. In a very cursory manner Lee and Kwok, [20], also make reference to DI
for non-bank depository institutions including credit unions. While several e¤ects are common to both FC and JSB,
as we will report later on, some considerable di¤rerences appear when considering DI for both types of insitutions.
We will ignore in this paper the arguments about the pros and cons of DI and will assume that the regulator has
sorted out these contradictions and has decided that a DI scheme for the FC is desirable.
The approach taken in this paper is a pragmatic one. We adopted a well known technique to model the objective
function of a …nancial intermediary and introduced modi…cations -also well accepted in the literature- that adapt
these functions to the situation of the typical FC. Then we introduced the DI using yet another accepted technique.
We evaluate moral hazard by comparing the levels of the optimal probabilities of default for a …nancial institution
with and without DI. The purpose of this approach is to make the modeling exercise as transparent as possible and
focus on the e¤ects that appear when introducing a DI scheme in a FC and how it di¤ers from that of a JSB. To
make the work even more transparent we model both the FC and the JSB and present results in parallel. Although
in the second case we obtain results that are already well accepted in the …nancial literature they allow us to make
the comparison of similarities and di¤erences simpler.
The organization of the paper is as follows: starting in Section 2 we provide some factual and legal information
related to FC; in Section 3 we focus on the formulation of the model that will be the basis of the analysis; in Section 4
we start exploiting this model to investigate the main questions of the paper: comparing the e¤ect of the introduction
of DI on both a FC and, as a benchmark, a JSB; in Section 5 we present results of a simulation designed to provide
sharper insights about di¤erences in behavior of both types of insitutions. In Section 6 we consider possible solutions
to curb moral hazard in FC. Section 7 provides conclusions and policy recommendations.
2 Governance of …nancial institutions risk taking
A number of fundamental di¤erences between JSB and CB suggest that there might be important ex-ante distinction
to be made in terms of risk to which these two types of institutions might be exposed. These di¤erences are related to
governance and to the nature of the contract between the contracting parties in presence of asymmetric information.
Perhaps the most important are:
² Agency con‡icts between shareholders and debtholders (moral hazard).
1This research is the result of a concrete need that was identi…ed at the Fondo de Garantías de Entidades Financieras (FOGAFIN),
Colombia, when it was faced, toward the end of 1997, with the responsibility of developing proposals to include FC under a deposit
insurance scheme. FOGAFIN faced two symmetric risks if it ignored the particularities of FC in structuring these proposals: i) based on
the “social nature” of the FC it could make the DI scheme too lax encouraging moral hazard, or ii) by adopting standards applicable to
a bank, it could make the DI scheme too severe. Both risks had to be avoided. The almost complete absence of research on this topic as
well as the fact that no empirical data was available to study the actual behavior of FC in presence of a deposit insurance scheme–since
there was none–forced us to take a theoretical approach to the problem.
2The expression “Credit Unions” (CU) to describe FC is a practice established predominantly in the United States. In this paper, we
will use the more general expression FC.
3Kane and Hendershott, [13], analyze how di¤erences in incentive structure constraint the attractiveness of interest rate speculation
and other risk taking activities to managers and regulators of USA credit unions. The approach is mostly empirical and adapted to
the particular characteristics and regulatory environment in which these credit unions operate. Although it provides some interesting
insights, their applicability to the context of a FC in most developing countries is very limited.
1² Agency con‡icts between managers and shareholders (managerial conservatism and entrechment).
² The role of deposit insurance.
Our focus is on the third. It is widely known that the presence of deposit insurance encourages JSB shareholders
to take even more risk (see Kopcke, [18]; Milhaupt, [22]; Brewer, [2]; Carr et al. [4]; Brewer and Mondschean, [3];
Dreyfus et al.[6]; Hassan et al., [10]; Keeley, [15] to mention just a few), and this incentive increases as the …nancial
situation of the bank deteriorates in what is known as ”gambling for survival”. Again, this gambling for survival
is related to the ”option-like” property of the deposit insurance and bank shares (Flood, [8]; Merton [21]). To our
knowledge, no explicit model nor study exists that attempts to assess the e¤ect of introducing a deposit insurance on
FC incentives to expose the insurer to moral hazard. While JSB have often exercised the right to transfer liabilities of
the institution to the deposit insurer (i.e. exercise the put option bought from the deposit insurer), FC belonging to
major national network rarely exercise this option. Instead, in these networks, failing institutions are absorbed in the
system through a process of mutualization of the failing CB liabilities, either through internal institution insurance
schemes or through cession of assets and liabilities to the rest of the system.4 Further, most (but not all) cooperative
bank networks have built in their own ”insurance funds.” One notable exception are atomized United States styled
CU movements where individual cooperatives do not belong to a tightly organized network of institutions. There,
CU were rescued by a deposit insurance schemes specialy designed for the movement, which, after the latest reform,
is owned collectively by a¢liated CU. Even there, Kane and Hendershott [13] in a suggestively titled article, ”The
Federal Deposit Insurance Fund That Didn’t Put a Bite on U.S. Taxpayers,” explain the judicious use United
States CU have made of their deposit insurance scheme, in stark contrast to the stock owned components of the
…nancial system. Also focusing on the United States, Karels and McClatchey [14] examine the relationship between
deposit insurance and risk-taking behavior within the credit union industry. Time series tests employing industry
average …nancial ratios for federal and state credit unions did not support the increased risk-taking hypothesis.
Although federal credit union capital declined immediately following the adoption of deposit insurance, the authors
speculate that this was most likely the result of reduced capital requirements, not deposit insurance. Liquidity and
loan delinquency ratios had a negative time trend coe¢cient, implying a decline in risk-taking behavior during the
post-insurance period. Overall the authors found no evidence that the adoption of deposit insurance increased the
risk-taking behavior of credit unions.
FC are considered a part of the “solidarity economy” with rules of operation that are di¤erent from those of
stock banks. As noted by Smith, Cargill and Meyer [28] among others, in a FC members are both owners of the
intermediary and consumers (suppliers) of its output (input). They are considered non-pro…t organizations since their
goal is to serve the member and not to accumulate monetary pro…ts. It is particularly di¢cult to model FC with
some exactitude. The nature of their objective function is complicated by the Cooperative Identity statement; the
function of a cooperative (…nancial or otherwise) is guided by the seven principles of the International Cooperatives
Association (ICA).5 A pro…t maximizing objective function is hence generally considered inadequate to represent
the behavior of FC. A FC, typically has a general non-pro…t objective, but this objective is attached to three other
objectives that a¤ect directly its management style: maximize services to its members at minimum cost; return
the surplus of operations (pro…ts) to its members, mostly in the form of services; or alternatively accumulate those
surpluses in forms of capital reserves to strengthen the institution and facilitate its growth. Therefore, all FC do not
share the same goals or objectives. However, we will assume a general objective function in Section 3 that follows
the tradition of the theory of this type of institution.
Because the FC intermediates between its member-net-savers and its members-net-borrowers a con‡ict of interests
arises. The importance of this con‡ict is that there is a considerable shift of interests away from savers to borrowers,
something that doesn’t happen in a JSB. The stockholders of these (or their agents) keep control of the decision
process while borrowers are totally excluded. In FC with a strong borrower control, the likelihood of moral hazard
arising is large, leading to severe problems of con…dence in the system.
4One case where a cooperative movement took advantage of the state-sponsored deposit insurance scheme is the one that occurred
in 1981 when in Quebec numerous cooperatives in one of the two then existing movements, the Ligue des caisses d’économie, failed.
However, posterior liquidation of assets allowed the deposit insurance fund to recoup all advances made to depositors.
5http://www.coop.org/ica
22.1 Deposit Insurance for FC: issues
When faced with risk, there are three possible responses: transfer, retention and avoidance. We will analyze the case
where risk is transferred to a third party such as a government agency, insurance company or a …nancial cooperatives
movement. In this case, a premium is paid by the insured institution to cover against a potential loss. This premium
can be …xed or a function of the size of the exposure and the degree of risk. With due cause, the members of the
cooperative will feel safer knowing that their savings are protected should the FC be forced to liquidate.
DI for FC has lately become an important issue. By protecting the savings of depositors, DI stabilizes the
…nancial intermediary which in turn limits the likelihood of bank runs. The mounting of safety nets for FC is gaining
momentum, especially in countries for which this net already exists for the JSB and other depository institutions. In
some countries, such as Canada, FC have put in place “stabilization funds” which have goals similar to DI. As these
types of institutions have carved their positions in the …nancial markets around the world, regulators are taking a
second look at them and starting to worry about their …nancial stability.6 There are several reasons that justify this
concern by regulators. Among these we mention:
² FC capture the savings of an increasingly large and mostly lower income population;
² They have become attractive intermediaries to provide access to …nancial services to MSE, rural …nancing and
other less advantaged social sectors;
² The last 15 years have been a scenario of several burst-bust-burst experiences in the sector for several emerging
markets (EM).7
DI is far from a perfect solution to all …nancial institution problems; ‡aws are present in its American form as
discussed by Barth, Bradley and Feid [1]. Numerous studies were done on the pricing of DI, the best known derivation
of the cost function was presented by Merton [21] which prices DI using derivatives theory. In this analysis, we will
not attempt to de…ne the exact pricing of the DI for a FC, we will simply assume that it is a positive function of
risk and we will analyze the e¤ects on moral hazard of this risk pricing.
The research gap in this area is considerable. There are a number of issues that need to be addressed regarding
the setup of a DI for FC but that are impossible to cover in this paper. These include:
² Should the DI scheme cover depositors or institutions?8;
² How should the level of premia compare in comparison with other depository institutions?9;
² Should the premia be considered an expense or a rent-earning contribution to a capital fund?;
² Should the fund be administered by the cooperative system itself or by an independent (e.g. government)
agency10;
² Should deposits and shares (equity parts) to FC be covered or only the …rst?11
Some of these questions may seem strange when one is familiar with the DI debate in the context of JSB but
start to make sense when studying some of the problems and practices of DI schemes for FC.
6In some countries, particularly in europe, mutual …nancial intermediaries organized in networks are the prime …nancial institution
representing sometimes up four times the …nancial assets of the largest PMSB.
7This cycle of burst-bust-burst has put in evidence not only the (questionable) necesity of a DI scheme but also to understand much
better the governance of FC and the role of external …nancing in the decision making of the cooperatives, to mention just two issues.
8Insurance for institutions would be an anathema in the context of JSB, however this is not so obvious in the case of FC. In Germany,
as in other countries with similar FC organizations, the DI for the highly successful Rai¤eisen Cooperative Banks system covers the
institutions. For JSB, on the other hand, DI covers depositors but not institutions. There are indeed a number of arguments that support
the idea that a DI for FC should cover the institution.
9Besides the fact that it is doubly di¢cult toassess value of FC assets, it is worth notingthat a much larger proportion of the liabilities
of a FC are covered by the DI. This is so because the great majority of liabilities are small and come under even the most stringent
ceilings in DI converage.
10Here, as in other questions, the experiences are quite di¤erent. In some countries the DI scheme is managed by the system itself as
part of alarger scheme of delegated monitoring (e.g. Germany). In other cases the fund is managed by a government agency (e.g. United
States, see Walker, [32]). To see the complexity of the issue one only needs to refer to the recently booming debate about private (or
joint private/government) insurance schemes in the United States (see for example Kane [12] and Lai and Wariwoda [19]).
11It should be remembered that in FC equity is not permanent, as a members can walk away from the institution when she wishes
withdrawing her shares. Usually limitations may exist –specially for situations on …nancial stress– but this only implies a postponement
of the withdrawal right.
33 The Model
In this section we introduce a neo-classical formal model of a …nancial intermediary adapted to the particular problem
of the FC. We adopt here some elements of the objective function formulation by Smith, Cargill and Meyer (SCM)
[28] embeded in a standard model of …nancial intermediation under information-assymetry .
3.1 Outline
Assume a FC with an objective function that depends on the value to members of their transactions with the FC.
There are twotypes of members in a typical FC. Those whose principal relationship with the FC is that of a saver, and
those that are principally borrowers12. As in extant modeling practices for FC, we represent the value to borrowers
(and to savers) by the di¤erence between the interest rate the FC charges (pays) to members and the best alternative
reference rate available at the time with a JSB, net of costs and adjusted to the risk of loans. Assuming an overall
environment of credit rationing, we assume that the availability of more credit to borrowers is valued higher than
the availability of less credit. We also assume that FC are able to raise funds in the market (through deposits, CDT
or bonds) from non-members13 at market rates. We articulate the “con‡ict” of interests that the FC has to solve by
maximizing a function that contains the weighted utilities for both types of members (borrowers and savers) net of
costs.
To facilitate the understanding of how a FC operates and the implications this has for DI we will develop
simultaneously two models: one for a FC along the lines described above, and one of a standard JSB, along the
lines of Stiglitz and Weiss [29] and Tybout [30] among others, a case which is much better understood. Therefore
although some of the results presented here for the stock bank may appear super‡uous, they play the role of being
the “base case” against which the case of the FC is contrasted. We take some elements of the work by Kambhu [11],
in particular the way DI is introduced into the objective function for the JSB and the FC.
3.2 Assumptions
Assume a …nancial institution subject to a number of technical and regulatory constraints. We de…ne the main






² Qi; is the level of loans made to borrowers (or risky investments) (i = L); savings by depositors (i = S) and
“short term funds” (i = D). L and S are non-negative, D can be either positive (money market investment)
or negative (debt issue). We impose the following restriction:
0 < QS ¼ QL < 1
² K is the capital of the …rm. For the FC, it is composed of member shares, reserves and retained earnings.
Our methodology also assumes that the …nancial intermediary is characterized by the following variables and
assumptions:
12There is, of course, nothing special in this. This is indeed the same type of situation that exists in a standard JSB. The particularity
of a FC resides in the fact that both types of members have the potential of in‡uencing the decision process, something that is not possible
in a JSB.
13Alternatively, members can invest in the FC either by buyingshares or making standard deposits that areassumed to becompensated
at standard market rates.
14We expand on the components of the balance sheet in Section 3.6.
4² Ri;j;is the gross rate earned (charged) on these assets where i is the type of assets (L;S;D) and j is the type of
institution (FC;JSB;M). It is assumed that the market (M) interest rate (RD;M) charged on D is the same
for an investment or a debt issue 15. The rate charged to borrowers (RL;j) and the rate o¤ered to savers (RS;j)
are sensitive to the risk, !, taken by the intermediary. In the presence of DI, RS;j is insensitive to risk (!). The
risk free (money market) investment QD is assumed to always exist and be available to the intermediary. This
may simply represent the reserves kept with the central bank earning a rate of RD;M ¸ 0; or in a stabilization
fund or liquidity fund as is often the case for FC. We impose the following restrictions:








@!2Ri;j (!) = 016:
As we will se later on, these restrictions will prove key to our formulation of the moral hazard (MH) problem
following the introduction of DI.
² G represents the liquidation value of guarantees provided by the borrower.
² The intermediary is risk neutral.
² Each investment, generates a random end-of-period cash ‡ow of X with density f(X;!), where ! is an index
of risk of the project and hence borrower17. X is a random variable representing the terminal cash ‡ows of the
borrower.
² This is a two-period model in which the intermediary (j) contracts the funds from depositors/bondholders/member
at a rate RS;j, then turns around and decides on the portfolio allocation. The positions are liquidated in the
second period and we therefore have no asset liability management (ALM) complications.
² The expectation of the cash ‡ows resulting from a loan is based on the following probability restriction18
S (QLRL;FC(!) ¡ G) = 0
given the fact that default occurs when G + X · QLRL;FC(!).
² The ownership of the FC is determined by the number of shares only. The level of funds (loans or savings) has
no in‡uence on the decision making .
3.3 De…nition of Risk
With respect to the risk characteristics of the borrowers, we say that a borrower L, is a “better” risk class than a





f(XH;!H)dX; for any u; 0 · u · 1: (1)
For convenience we adopt the de…nition of “mean preserving risk” of Rothschild and Stiglitz [26] and will say
that an increase in ! is a mean preserving risk increase if the two following conditions are met:
15We comment on this assumption in the conclusion.






@!2RL;F C (!) = 0; but for ease of interpretation we assume a linear
relationship.
17The parameter ! can also be considered to be the index of pessimism of Tybout [30] and Virmani [31].
18S(t) = Pr(T > t) = 1¡F (t) = 1¡Pr(T < t)
5Z 1
0
[dF(X;!)=d!]dX = 0 (2)
Z y
0
[dF(X;!)=d!]dX ¸ 0 for 0 · y · 1
Given de…nition (2), a …nancial institution will be more “risk tolerant” the higher the ! it will be willing to accept,
keeping other parameters of the model constant, or the less sensitive some lending parameters (such as lending rates
and loan size) are to changes in !.
It is di¢cult to ascertain the ability of a FC to screen loans and collect receivables. Frequently, the FC has the
advantage of lending to a close knit community; the lender will know the personality/characteristics of the borrower
and/or the borrower wants to maintain his19 reputation in the community. The importance of reputation should not
be underestimated since micro…nance schemes often operate in small communities and the lending activity might
be done in conjunction with a lending circle20. JSB usually do not have such close personal relationships to the
borrowers. They do however usually operate with a more diverse pool of borrowers which reduces risks and with
more advanced systems to screen and collect loans. FC also show a higher risk tolerance to potential borrowers (see
Smith et al. [28]). For simplicity purposes, we will assume that the ability of a FC and a JSB to identify the risk
(!) is the same.
3.4 The Pro…t Function




(X + G)f(X;!)dX ¡ QSRS;FC(w) + QDRD;M (3)
E(¼F C(!)) represents the pro…t or operating excedents function for a FC. As we will see later on, contrary to the
JSB, the pro…t function for the FC di¤ers from its objective function.
Although it is often done, we do not include …xed transaction costs in this function. We do this mostly because,
for being …xed, these disappear when we compute the optimal risk taking probability of default of the function and
thus have no e¤ect on the solution.
Given our initial assumptions, the …rst term of equation 3 represents the expectation of cash ‡ows resulting from
an investment in a loan. The second and third terms represent respectively the amounts “borrowed” from savers
and the market investments (or borrowings from the market).
After some algebra 21, equation (3) can be rewritten as





where F(X;!) represents the probability of borrower insolvency.
To note in this particular formulation is the parameter G that represents the guarantees, that the borrower is
putting up to secure the loan. We assume that G is a known quantity. The reason for including guarantees (in
contrast, for example to Stiglitz and Weiss [29] who use the equity investment of the …rm, or Tybout [30], who uses
none) is to make the model applicable to a wider range of situations. In most EM real guarantees they play a very
special role in lending activities, in many ways quite di¤erent from the practices of most industrialized economies.
By and large, project related guarantees are of little value in lending activities while the guarantees demanded by
19Although it is very appropriate in an analysis of FC to include females since they represent a large proportion of the clientele, we
will use the masculine form in this essay for simplicity.
20A lending circle is a small group of people in which all member are borrowers. They have been introduced in Bangladesh by the
Grameen Bank (http://www.grameen-info.org) to help the members with the borrowing process and also for “peer pressure” in the
repayment of the loan.
21Detailed in Appendix A
6lenders are mostly real estate or cash guarantees (see Fleisig [7]). This is particularly true for EM based MSE where
a long standing tradition exists of collateralizing business loans with real estate. Although it is true that many MSE
owners possess enough real estate to collateralize their business loans (in which case their access to the loan market
will be much easier), many more are not in that position. In practice, a substantial portion of micro-enterprise loans
in a typical EM bank, appear as personal-unsecured loans in their books. While in the case of a real estate secured
loan default for whatever reason, genuine insolvency or moral hazard related, can easily be resolved by seizing the real
estate collateral, this is not possible in the absence of such collateral. By de…ning G as the equity portion provided
by the borrower we are back to the traditional formulation of the problem applicable to industrialized countries.
3.5 The Objective Function
For a JSB; the pro…t function is the same as the utility function:





Functions (4) and (5) represent the typical objective function 22 of the JSB …rm and this is the function we will
use here as the basis of our analysis to describe the behavior of the stock bank. On the other hand, the objective
function for FC (see Smith et al. [28]), can be written as follows
UFC = ¸ NGL + ® NGS + E (¼FC(!))
The logic of this objective function is the following. ¸ and ® represents the weight net-borrowers and net-savers
respectively have on the decision making process of the FC, however this might present itself institutionally. As
previously mentionned in the assumptions, they represent the level of shares held by net borrowers and net savers
respectively; which is re‡ected by the in‡uence each group has on the decision making process. We have assumed
distinctive weights instead of setting ® = 1 ¡ ¸ since this enables us to better assess the impact net-borrowers and
net-savers have on moral hazard and also to set ¸ = ® = 0 to study the behavior of a bank in a similar situation.
We therefore have the restriction that either
® + ¸ = 1
or
® = ¸ = 0:
We assume that borrowers and savers are either net borrowers or net savers, and that positions that result from
transactions are all net positions. The purpose of this distinction is to insure that the two types of participants act
accordingly.
The values of ¸ and ® take is of crucial relevance. If ¸ ¼ 1:0 we can say that the FC is “net-borrower dominated”,
while if ® ¼ 1:0 we say that the FC is “net-saver dominated”.
The Net Gain on Loans (NGL) is de…ned as (RL;JSB (!) ¡ RL;FC (!)) QL ¡ G. Ceteris paribus, a FC net-
borrower will prefer a loan rate, RL;FC (!), inferior to the one obtained at the JSB, RL;JS B (!), (assuming that
this member has access to credit elsewhere), a larger amount of credit, QL, (or a smaller cash interest payment given
a loan size) and a smaller guarantee, G.
The Net Gain on Savings (N GS) is de…ned as (RS;FC (!) ¡ RS;JSB)QS: A FC net-creditor will prefer a higher
return on his savings over some comparable rate available in the market (provided that this saver has access to
another …nancial institution that o¤ers savings products) and a larger amount QS invested at this higher return23.
When analyzing NGS we consider that the JSB has DI and therefore o¤ers a risk free savings rate not function of !.
22Objective function and utility function are used interchangeably.
23In the case of the net-saver member there is also value attached to the capitalization of the FC as an increase in retained earnings
tends to increase the utility of the net-saver member. One could therefore justify the use of ®
£¡






7Therefore, the utility funtion of the FC is
UFC = ¸ ((RL;JSB (!) ¡ RL;FC (!)) QL ¡ G) (6)
+® (RS;FC (!) ¡ RS;JSB )QS





As previously mentioned, this function24 compares the utility of being in an FC without DI to a JSB with DI.
A closer inspection of the objective function presented above reveals that we de…ne as “bene…t” arising from the
intermediation process of the FC the reduction in cost for borrowers and increase in saving returns for savers over
that of a JSB. Under “returns” to savers we include all other non-pecuniary bene…ts they may extract from being
members of the FC. These non-pecuniary bene…ts, as we know, can be quite large. In EM, it can be the case that to
o¤er services to the population regardless of class, sex or income is a bene…t in itself. Technically, for a FC o¤ering
services where no other alternative is available, RS;JSB would be equal to zero (non-existent since no substitue exists)
and RL;JS B (!) would be substantially high. Loans would originate, from moneylenders such as paykars in rural areas
of Banglasdesh (see Yunus [33], p. 47-52) or from “pawn shops” in urban centres such as Chicago or Montreal. In
this type of environment, the utility function of a FC would be quite high.
3.6 Inclusion of Deposit Insurance
The method to introduce deposit insurance premia follows the approach taken by Kambhu [11]. The DI is included
through the balance sheet restriction
QL + QD + ½QS = QS + (K ¡ P (!)) (7)
where ½ represents the reserve (or liquidity) requirements; P (!) is the DI premia that can be either …xed or, as is the
case here, made a function of the risk (!); K is the capital that meets capital requirement standards. As mentioned
in the assumptions (Section 3.2), QD can be either positive or negative; it represents the short liquidity needs of the








@!2 P (!) = 025;
e.g. P (!) is a positive linear function of risk.




½QS K ¡ P (!) :
By solving restriction (7) for QS we have:
24Objective functions similar to (6) of the weighted average of social welfare function are used not only to model FC behavior but
have become canonical in modeling the …nancing and investment decisions of …rms under conditions of asymmetric information, e.g. in
dividend decisions (Miller and Rock, [23]), capital structure (Ross, [25]) among many others.
25We could also assume that
@
2
@!2P (!) ¸ 0, i.e. a non-linear increasing function. Results remain essentially unchanged.
8QS =
QL + QD + P(!) ¡ K
1 ¡ ½
(8)
and introducing into equations (6) we obtain
UFC;DI = ¸ [(RL;JSB (!) ¡ RL;F C (!))QL ¡ G] (9)
¡
(QL + QD + P (!) ¡ K)
1¡ ½





this is the objective function for a FC with DI. Note that, due to the presence of DI the deposit rate RS;FC is
riskless e.g. not adjusted to the risk ! assumed by the intermediary.
UFC;no DI and UFC;DI are the functions to be maximized for the FC. Setting ¸ = ® = 0 in (9) gives the objective
function to be maximized for the JSB with DI. We will concentrate our e¤orts on the di¤erence of behavior between
FC with and without DI. We will also consider the di¤erence of behavior between JSB with and without DI, as well
as the di¤erence between JSB with DI and FC with DI.
3.7 Optimal Risk Level
Ideally a …nancial institution will increase its risk level until it maximizes its utility function. This level of risk can
be found by setting the …rst derivative of (9) to zero.








































































(1 ¡ F(QLRL;FC(!) ¡ G;!)) = 0
for the FC with and without DI respectively. The second derivatives of (10) and (11) are negative26 and hence the
utility functions are in fact maximized at these levels of risk. To measure the level of risk assumed by both types of
intermediaries at the optimum, we solve both equation (10) and (11) for the probability of default F(QLRL;F C(!) ¡
G;!). To simplify the presentation, we set








26See Appendix A for proof that the second derivatives are in fact negative.
9this derivative is positive by assumption (see equation 2). This yields, for the FC without DI
















































RL;F C (!) ¡ RL;JSB (!)










Fx;! (!) (1¡ ½) + @
@ !P (!)RS;FC (!)







The borrower portion for equations (12) and (13) are identical . The introduction of DI changes the risk structure
of the FC especially for member-savers since their deposit rates become risk free.
Using the same steps (or by simply replacing ¸ and ® by zero) we determine the following “optimal risk taking
probability of default” for the JSB



















Fx;! (!) (1 ¡ ½) + RS;JSB
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@!P (!)
QL (1 ¡ ½)
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Fj;¢(Y;!) represents the probability of default of the optimal investment for the …nancial institution.
4 Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard
4.1 Moral Hazard in Financial Cooperatives
We compare equations (12) and (13) to assess the MH risk caused by the introduction of DI. We …nd that the optimal
risk taking probability of default is greater for the FC without DI by






















In the previous equation MHj corresponds to the arithmetic di¤erence between Fj;DI(Y;!) and Fj;no DI(Y;!) and
characterizes the moral hazard associated with DI for the …nancial intermediary j.
We expect the second term of equation (14) to be approximately equal to zero. The numerator is small, greater
than -1 and smaller than 1. The denominator is considerably large due to the quantity of funds loaned, QL : The
denominator is a positive function since 0 < ½ < 1 and the sensibility of the lending rate to risk is a positive function.
Due to the fairly large denominator, we can approximate the second to zero,









@! RL;F C (!)
¢ ¡ 0 (15)
and since the fraction is approximately equal to one,
MHFC ¼ (1¡ ®) = ¸
10Evidently, equation (15) is a strictly positive function. The greater the weight of net member-borrowers, the
greater the increase in the level of risk following the introduction of DI 27. Therefore, a FC where borrower tend to
dominate should operate at a higher risk level (!) than one where savers tend to dominate.
Returning to equation (14) we can also state that MH will be high if:
² the level of funds invested in the FC by savers is small relatively to the loans made to borrowers, e.g. a small
capital base
and
² the rate charged to borrowers is insensitive to variations in the risk level
¡
@
@! RL;FC (!) = 0
¢
.
Equation (14) has a surprising characteristic: MHF C is a positive function of the level of savings QS. However,
we assume throughout this analysis that the in‡uence on the decision making is determined solely by ® and ¸; we
disregard their (more than likely) relationship to the level of funds QS and QL respectively.
4.1.1 Can MHFC be negative?
To facilitate the interpretation of their intrinsic values, we choose to analyze the required values of RS;F C (!) and
QS for MHFC to be negative. We must have
RS;FC (!) >

















(®RS;JSB + (1¡ ®)RS;FC)




to obtain an “inverse moral hazard” (the introduction of insurance would actually decrease the risk taking).
In (16), we have a large numerator due to QS and a small denominator (all elements are de…ned as smaller than
one). Therefore this fraction should be greater than the possible values of RS;FC (!). A similar interpretation can
be made to show that (17) should also not occur. Therefore the ”ìnverse moral hazard” e¤ect is highly unlikely.
4.2 Moral Hazard and Pro…t Maximizing Stock Banks






















This result can be found by setting ® = 0 in equation (14) and adjusting the appropriate rates from a FC rate
to a JSB rate. Nonetheless, to check results, we derived equation (18) using the same methodology as for the FC.
27We can also express the relationship as






























to better gauge the net saver-member in‡uence.
114.2.1 Can MHJSB be negative?























A quick analysis shows that (19) and (20) are unreasonable.
4.3 MHFC relative to MHJSB
Assuming the FC and JSB have similar levels of funds, reserve requirements, rate and premium sensibilities to risk;
we can approximately state that









Therefore, given similar characteristics, a FC should exhibit less moral hazard than a JSB following
the introduction of a DI scheme. Further, cetris paribus, the optimal level of risk taking by a JSB is equal
to that of a FC where net borrowers totally dominate (¸ = 1:0). As we will not4e in more detail later on, this is
theoretically impossible and against empirical evidence.
Why would the moral hazard of a cooperative be less than that of a pro…t maximizing institution? As mentioned
in the …nancial literature, the equity held by the investors in a stock bank is similar to a call option; the investors
have a limited liability with unlimited upside potential and would therefore be willing to accept higher levels of risk.
This di¤erence in moral hazard levels is in direct relation to the weight of the net-saver member. In the case where
the FC is “net borrower dominated” (® = 0), the moral hazards of the two institutions are equal; the di¤erence in
MH levels is at its greatest where the FC is “net saver dominiated” (® = 1). As previously mentioned, net-savers
desire safety for their funds; volatility (riskiness) is not in their best interest. Also, a high level of net-savers is
equivalent to a low level of net-borrowers, who are basically the “risky investments”.
5 Simulations: The distributional properties of MHi
To further our understanding of the possible range of MH values (positive or negative), simulations were performed
using equation (14) and (18), by assuming distributions for each of the variables of the MHi;i = F C;JSB. From
these simulations, we obtain a distribution of MHi skewed to the right and positive on all its domain which is in
line with the analysis presented above.
12Other statistics associated with the simulations are presented in the following table:








Coe¤. of Variability 0.76 0.75
Range Minimum 0.0011109 0.0028983
Range Maximum 0.1115339 0.2219202
Range Width 0.1104229 0.2190219
Mean Std. Error 0.0002489 0.0004845
Of interest is that, for equal parameter inputs, while for JSB the range min and max are 0.0029 and 0.2190 with
a median of 0.042, for FC the values go from 0.0011 to 0.1115 with a median of 0.021. That is, FC display much
lower values of MHi over the whole range with a median that is about half that of JSB. The mean for FC is also
about half of that for JSB, although in both cases it is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Of interest is also the sensitivity of MHi to the di¤erent input parameters. Measured by the rank correlation,
the distribution of the sensitivity of the savings rate to risk is the critical assumption for both FC and JSB, with a
13rank correlation of close to 1.0 in both cases. For this, a lognormal distribution was chosen with a mean of 5.0% and
a standard deviation of 5.0% to have a mode relatively close to zero. This is bad news since savings rates o¤ered by
FC are often very unsensitive to risk exposure of the institution because members lack access to other institutions.
Next in order–but of opposite sign–is the sensitivity of the lending rate (RS;i (!)) to risk with a rank correlation of
about -0.15. Here again, as noted before (also by Smith et al. [28])) the almost universal practice is that FC tend not
to adjust rates to project risk with the same rates being o¤ered to all members. In the case of FC this is followed by
®; the level of net-saver member control with a rank correlation of about -0.10. This analysis shows @
@ !RS;FC (!) ;
–i.e. the sensitivity of the savings rate to changes in the FC’s asset risk in absence of a DI– as a decisive variable in
the value of MH.
Perhaps a closing statement that can be made with respect to this simulation is that market parameters (savings
and lending rates) are unlikely to present a great deterrent to risk taking in FC since they usually operate under
less-competitive market conditions that JSB. This latter are likely to face much more competitive savings rates
(specially in the interbank money market) that will be considerably more sensitive to asset portfolio risk exposure.
This observation provides an excellent motivation to the analysis presented in the following section where we focus
on regulatory mechanisms to curb FC risk taking.
6 Mechanisms to Curb Moral Hazard
We thus have a similar situation in JSB and FC. For both institutions, the introduction of DI increases the “optimal
risk taking”. These theoretical …ndings are no doubt interesting in themselves. However, FC regulators are concerned
by more practical matters such as how they can curb or control MH. Given our previous relationships, we will
investigate whether it is possible to curb MH using regulatory restrictions. This tactic has traditionally risen in the
context of JSB for which regulatory capital is the most common approach.
We now tackle some key questions that appear with the introduction of an insurance scheme for FC:
² Does it matter whether the premia, P, is …xed or risk-adjusted? (section 5.1)
² Does it matter whether the regulatory capital, K, is …xed or risk-adjusted? (section 5.2)
² Does it matter whether the reserve requirements, ½, are …xed or risk-adjusted? (section 5.3)
Of course, we know, from an extensive literature, the answer to the two …rst questions in the case of the JSB–
reserve requirements is ususally not an considered in JSB as a mechanism to curb moral hazard, although it could.
Thus following our approach, this is of concern to us only to the extent that it helps us to better understand the
“toolbox” of FC or regulation agencies to deal with MH. For the case of the FC, we can add a further question of
interest:
² Does it matter whether the FC is net-borrower dominated or net-saver dominated? (section 5.4)
We proceed to investigate each these questions.
6.1 Does it Matter Whether the Premia is Fixed or Risk-Adjusted?
6.1.1 Financial Cooperatives
Updating equation (8) and equation (9) to include a …xed premia P instead of a risk adjusted premia P (w) we obtain
QS =
QL + QD + P ¡ K
1 ¡ ½
and the corresponding utility function
UFC;DI = ¸ [(RL;JSB (!) ¡ RL;F C (!))QL ¡ G]
¡
(QL + QD + P (!) ¡ K)
1¡ ½





14This yields the following MH relationship:
MH
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With regards to our initial assumptions (Section 2.1.1) equation (22) is positive on all its domain and is equal to
the …rst term of equation (14). Given that the second term of that equation is negative, we conclude that a …xed
premia increases moral hazard, e.g. a risk-adjusted premia does in fact curb moral hazard in FC!.
However, as seen in the development to equation (15), this second term is relatively small (¼ 0). In economic
terms, this near insensitivity to risk adjusted premia we obtain for the FC can be explained as follows. First, let us
tackle the issue of the e¤ect of a risk-adjusted DI premia on risk taking. In FC, in absence of restrictions on capital
accumulation (as is our case), members are indi¤erent to the results (called “operating surplus”) and therefore to
the e¤ect of a risk-adjusted DI premia on these results. Net savers are interested mostly in the “spread” they receive
on their savings and net borrowers in the risk tolerance the FC displays in its operations (a lower rate and higher
amount of loans). This explains the negligible e¤ect of an adjustment to the premia on the optimal risk taking. In
fact, the simulation study (Appendix B) ranked the sensitivity of the premia to risk sixth out of ten on the sensitivity
chart for the moral hazard of an FC. As long as the operating results are enough to maintain the spread, members
will be indi¤erent to increases in premia.
The more detailed relationship (equation 14) of moral hazard to the sensitivity of the premia to risk, enables us
to better analyze the characteristics of this relationship. The second term of equation (14) contains the sensitivity
of the premia to risk. This term is negative and hence, the higher its value, the lower the value of the overall MH
equation. Consequently, the higher the sensitivity of the premia to risk, the lower the moral hazard (which is what
is hoped for). However, bringing the premia more sensitive to risk than need be ( @
@! P (!) > 1) we will observe
negative moral hazard e.g. the FC will in fact take on less risk following the introduction of DI due to the high costs
(premia) of risk taking. The potential bene…ts of “one more unit of risk” would be outweighted by the greater cost
of DI for this level of risk. This situation might be handy for situations where the insurer feels that the …nancial
institution needs to lower its overall risk level, otherwise the insurer would need to terminate the coverage of the
institution due to its excessive risk level.
6.1.2 Pro…t Maximizing Stock Banks














Comparing this result to equation (18), we see that as for the FC, a risk adjusted premia reduces moral hazard.
In the same vein, this risk adjustment only slightly reduces MH. As MHJSB compared to MHF C, we notice that
MH
A
JSB is higher than MH
A
FC by the weight of the net-savers; the higher the net-saver member level, the greater
the di¤erence.
6.2 Regulatory Capital (K)
6.2.1 Financial Cooperatives
Capital is the excess of assets over liabilities of a …rm; it is the ownership and net worth in a business. In a FC,
capital is composed of member shares, reserves and retained earnings. This is the …nancial base for a FC. There
are several authors that emphasized the importance of regulatory capital restrictions to curb MH in banks ( Kane
and Hendershott, [13]) and some others have proposed schemes of DI premia based on inverse scales of premia and
capitalization (see e.g. Chan, et al. [5] Kendall, [16], Kendall and Levonian, [17], among others).
How should capital be structured to minimize MH? Using the same approach as in section 5.1, we …nd the
following function
15MHB
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which we can compare to equation (14) to obtain
MH
B




RS;FC (!) (®RS;JSB + (1¡ ®) RS;FC)





Therefore, in a FC the greater the sensibility of capital requirements to risk, the greater the reduction
in moral hazard. The contribution of a risk adjusted capital is however in the same scale as the contribution of the
risk adjusted premia. One plausible solution to curb MH in FC would be to include both risk adjustments (premia
and capital).
6.2.2 Pro…t Maximizing Stock Banks
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This as the same implications as for the FC; greater sensitivity of capital to risk means lower moral hazard. We
also notice that MH
B
JSB is greater then MH
B
FC and a functi8on of the level of net-savers control.
6.3 Reserve Requirements (½)
Reserves requirements is rarely considered as a mechanism to control moral hazard in JSB. Reserves management is
considered fundamentally an instrument of monetary policy.28 Prior to 1990, reserve requirements for most JSB in
developed markets was between 3% to 5% of deposits. These regulations have however been phased out for multiple
purposes such as increasing the control of monetary policy and o¤ering a level playing …eld for all deposit taking
…nancial institutions. In any case, this analysis assumes that reserve requirements would be tied to the risk level of
the portfolio and not to the size of the deposits (a much simpler matter to implement). This assumption is evidently
more di¢cult to justify than simple capital requirement. However, in FC, reserve requirements that can go as high
as 10% of deposits (or assets!) are, in many counhtries, a common regulatory restriction that will insure liquidity of
institutions that have limited or no access to the interbank market and to Central Bank facilities.
6.3.1 Financial Cooperatives
Using the same approach we …nd that a risk adjusted reserve requirement yields the following
MH
C
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28Or, in developing countries operating under a …nancially repressed regime–a situation that is less and less frequent–, as a mechanism
to …nance …scal de…cit.
16for the FC. Given our assumptions for the introduction of DI in section 3.6 this is equivalent to
MH
C
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FC shows that a in a FC a risk adjusted reserve requirements should lead to lower moral hazard.29
6.4 Does it Matter Whether the Financial Cooperative is Net-Borrower Dominated
or Net-Saver Dominated?
Simplifying equation 14 we had obtained
MH
0
FC = (1¡ ®)
and determined that moral hazard in a …nancial cooperative is a positive function of the level of net-borrowers. It
is therefore desirable for a DI scheme that the FC be net-saver dominated. In fact, as some authors have shown, the
risk taken by the net-borrower dominated FC in its lending portfolio can be quite substantial. However, as shown
by Hart and Moore (H&M) [9], borrower domination has theoretical limits. H&M rely heavily on a version of the
Median Voter Theorem by Roberts [24]. The Median Voter Theorem predicts that the outcome will be that which
represents the median member and not that of either extreme. Moreover, if decisions are such that members in one
or the other extreme of the preference scale desert, a shift in the median will occur with the old median members
shifting in direction of the deserters and a new median appearing among members at the opposite side of the deserters
giving more weight to their preferences in future decisions.On an empirical ground, Smith [27] investigated whether
American Credit Unions (CU) tend to be dominated either by net-borrowers or by net-lenders. Smith found that on
average CUs tend toward the middle ground.
7 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to present a model that allows the evaluation of the e¤ects in terms of moral hazard of
introducing a deposit insurance scheme for …nancial cooperatives (FC) and how this compares with pro…t maximizing
stock banks (JSB). We also investigated some regulatory mechanisms that may be used by regulators to curb the
incentives to moral hazard that appear with the introduction of deposit insurance. Although we …nd that several of
the e¤ects that are known to exist when pro…t maximizing stock banks are covered by deposit insurance, there are a
number of details that distinguish the …nancial cooperative and that are relevant in the implementation of a deposit
insurance scheme for cooperatives. The main conclusions of the work are:




























We notice that both of these moral hazard equations are smaller than their counterparts without reserve requirements adjusted to risk.





j , we notice that its second term is more negative and hence risk adjusted capital would curb moral hazard
better than risk adjusted reserve requirements. This justi…es the preferential use in JSB of capital standards as a mechanism to curb
moral hazard.
17² Introduction of deposit insurance unambiguously leads to increases in optimal risk taking and thus moral hazard
in FC. However this e¤ect is lower for FC than for JSB. Simulations suggest that the e¤ect is about half an
intense in FC than in JSB. Generally, this is consistent with the empirical …ndings of Karels and McClatchey
[14] and Kane and Hendershott, [13].
² The optimal risk taking in a …nancial cooperative is a positive function of the level of control by net-borrowers
over net-savers. Measured by rank correlations, moral hazard exercicing behavior is most sensitive to the sen
² Moral hazard is greater for the pro…t maximizing bank than for the …nancial cooperative. This di¤erence
increases as the level of control by the member net-borrower increases. A …nancial cooperative net-borrower
dominated will exhibit the same levels of moral hazard as a pro…t maximizing bank.
Among the regulatory measures that regulators and supervisors can introduce to curb moral hazard in …nancial
cooperatives, we investigated and obtained the following:
² A premia adjusted to risk will curb moral hazard in the same fashion than risk adjusted capital requirements;
² Reserve requirements adjusted to risk will also contribute to curb moral hazard;
² A combination of the above risk adjustments will tend to curb better moral hazard than only one form of risk
adjustment.
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20Appendix A
A.1 Expectation of “Risky Investments”
The following describes the assumptions behind the expected cash ‡ow from risky investment equation.
S(t) = Pr(T > t) = 1 ¡ F (t) = 1¡ Pr(T < t)
G : Collateral, Guarantee
QL;J : amount invested in risky assets, e.g. Loans made by insitution J
RL;J : gross interest rate (1+r) charged on the loan by institution J
X : amount received from borrower
Default will occur if
G + X · QL;JRL;J
and we also the constraint
0 · X;
hence
0 · X · QL;JRL;J ¡ G:
The model is based on the the following assumption that
S(QL;JRL;J ¡ G) = 0
From this assumptions we can now model the expectation of our risky investments
E (risky inv) = E(X + G)
E (X + G) =
Z QL;JRL;J¡G
0



































A.2 SOC of utility function




































(1¡ F(QLRL;F C(!) ¡ G;!)) = 0
Given that RL;j ,RS;j and P (!) are linear function;
@2UFC;DI
@!2 = ¸QL [(0) ¡ (0)]
¡ (0)













































The same logic applies to equation (10).
22